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COVID-19 has disrupted everyday life worldwide and is the first disease event since the
1918 H1N1 Spanish influenza (flu) pandemic to demand an urgent global healthcare
response. There has been much debate on whether the damage of COVID-19 is due
predominantly to the pathogen itself or our response to it. We compare SARS-CoV-2
against three other major pandemics (1347 Black Death, 1520’s new world smallpox
outbreaks, and 1918 Spanish Flu pandemic) over the course of 700 years to unearth
similarities and differences in pathogen, social and medical context, human response
and behavior, and long-term social and economic impact that should be used to shape
COVID-19 decision-making. We conclude that <100 years ago, pandemic disease
events were still largely uncontrolled and unexplained. The extensive damage wreaked
by historical pandemics on health, economy, and society was a function of pathogen
characteristics and lack of public health resources. Though there remain many similarities
in patterns of disease spread and response from 1300 onwards, the major risks posed
by COVID-19 arise not from the pathogen, but from indirect effects of control measures
on health and core societal activities. Our understanding of the epidemiology and
effective treatment of this virus has rapidly improved and attention is shifting toward the
identification of long-term control strategies that balance consideration of health in at risk
populations, societal behavior, and economic impact. Policymakers should use lessons
from previous pandemics to develop appropriate risk assessments and control plans for
now-endemic COVID-19, and for future pandemics.
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INTRODUCTION
COVID-19 has disrupted everyday life worldwide. It is the first disease event since the 1918–
20 H1N1 Spanish influenza (flu) pandemic to demand an urgent global healthcare response,
propagated by the speed and likelihood of potential transmission. An understanding of how much
disruption is caused by the pathogen, and how much is caused by our reaction to its potential
presence, is essential. We compare SARS-CoV-2 against three other pathogens known for the
magnitude of their impact. Yersinia pestis, causative agent of the 1347 Black Death, is among
the most destructive pathogens in human history. Variola major, cause of the 1520s smallpox
outbreaks in the New World, exemplifies how disease impacts vary by population. Spanish flu is
most similar to the current pathogen, yet major differences exist regarding scientific advancements
and pre-existing immunity.
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We compare across these four major disease events the
rates of infection, likelihood of dying, and available diagnostics,
therapeutics and vaccines (Table 1). We examine the historical
impact of these largely unchecked pathogens upon populations
and economies. We discuss how culture and society’s collective
memory affect the response to pandemics and identify important
lessons for decision-making as we adapt to a new normal.











364.8 million 450.8 million (Americas 60.5
million) (2)
1.86 billion 7.80 billion
Mortality (% global
population)
In Europe, ≥25 million (25–75%
of European population) (3)
2–15 million Aztec deaths (4)
200,000 Incan deaths
Major contributor to 90%
population decline in the
Americans from 1,500 to
1,600 (2)





plague: approaching 100% (8)
Estimated ≥50% among Aztecs
and North Americans (9)
2–3% (5) 0.25–3.0% (10) (lower estimates
more likely)





proximity to fleas and animal
reservoir (8)
No previous exposure to disease
in region (“virgin soil”) (4)
Healthy 15–40 year olds,
secondary bacterial infection (5)
Old age, pre-existing conditions
(11)
Transmission Flea bite or close contact with
respiratory droplets of a
pneumonic plague patient (8)
Low direct
interpersonal transmission
Contact with respiratory droplets
or aerosols.
Patterns of behavior (contact
with the sick) likely enhanced
spread (12)
Low dose can be infectious (13)
Contact with respiratory droplets
or aerosols (5)






No knowledge of germ theory;
contemporary physicians
admitted no known effective
cures or treatments and
recommended fumigation,
bleeding, purging, etc. (15)
No knowledge of germ theory or
effective treatment among
Europeans or Americans. Among
Native Americans, isolation and
traditional medical practices
(e.g., sweat lodges, bathing) (9)
Knowledge of germ theory but
misidentification of aetioglocal
agent. Palliative care and
homeopathy employed. No
vaccine, antiviral, ventilators, or
antibiotics for secondary
pneumonia (16)
Causative virus isolated and
genome sequenced. Vaccines in









Travel restrictions and isolation at
the city-state level. Usually
severely enforced and aimed
against specific people groups
(17)
First record of quarantine.
Minimal; among Native
Americans, little evidence for
isolation of the sick or other
nonpharmaceutical interventions
(12)
Masks, social distancing, public
closures, limits on public
gatherings. Poorly and
sporadically enforced; ineffectual
and too late (17)
Near-global lockdown,
quarantine, masks, track and
trace (14)
Implementation varies by
country, ranging from highly
successful to poorly enforced.
Population Effects Strong, lasting effect negative
effect on global population
growth. European population did
not recover to pre-plague levels
until mid-16th century (18)
Minimal effect on global
population growth, but wiped out
populations in New World
(∼90%), extinction of some
people groups (4)
Temporary global population
growth decline during period of
outbreak (6)
No anticipated effects on global
population growth.
Corollary effects on public health
may reduce life expectancy (19)
Long Term
Economic Effects
Labor shortages led to higher
wages, European peasant
revolts, and shifts in
sociodemographic power
dynamics. Increased innovation
and mobility of labor (18)
Shift balance of power in New
World, leading to societal
collapse of Native Americans
and enriching colonial European
powers (4)
Limited and obscured by WWI.
Sharp but short-term effects on
industry. Entry of new groups
into labor force (20)
Towns that had quick shutdowns
fared better




surge in poverty, lower
investment, reduced global
trade. Strongest impact in
developing economies (21)
*Figures accurate as of 18 December, 2020.
EPIDEMIOLOGY
SARS-CoV-2 differs from Y. pestis, V. major and Spanish flu
in terms of disease transmission and pathophysiology. Of these
four, it is the least deadly, and poses the lowest risk to otherwise
healthy people; however increasing evidence suggests significant
long-term sequelae for a proportion of individuals who have
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symptoms. The Black Death had exceedingly high case fatality
rates (CFRs), approaching 100% for septicemic and pneumonic
plague and 50–60% for the bubonic form of the disease (8).
Over a third of the European population died during the
1347 outbreak, with some regions experiencing up to 75%
mortality (22). CFRs for smallpox amongst immunologically
naïve native Americans in the 1520s were estimated at 50% (9),
and many survivors were left disfigured or blinded. Smallpox
(and other European diseases) drove an estimated 90% decrease
in indigenous populations in the Americas from 1500 to 1600 (2).
Spanish flu had a CFR estimated at 2–3% (23) and few known
long-term effects, other than occasional extended convalescence
and limited instances of neuropsychiatric disorders (24). Current
COVID-19 CFR estimations range from 0.3 to 3.0%, with lower
estimates more likely to be accurate (10). There are growing
reports of secondary and long-term impacts from COVID-19,
typically among hospitalized patients but also among less severe
cases. These include poor cardiovascular functioning (25), wide-
ranging neurological symptoms (26), chronic fatigue (27), and
others, with some patients needing long-term convalescence.
While it is too early to fully understand the long-term impacts of
COVID-19, similar post-viral syndromes have also been observed
among those infected with SARS (28).
It is unknown how many people were infected during the
Black Death and 1520s smallpox outbreaks. An estimated 500
million people (1 in 3 worldwide) were infected with Spanish flu
and 1–3% of the global population died from the disease (5). Thus
far, 75.1 million people have been confirmed to have COVID-19
(∼1 in 104), killing 0.02% of the global population (7).
Disease susceptibility and immunological naivety influence
the outcome of pandemic disease events. Both plague and
smallpox are highly infectious and affect people of all ages,
though smallpox exhibits a significantly higher mortality rate
amongst children compared to adults (9). Spanish flu had severe
impacts amongst the otherwise healthy 15–40 age group while
also affecting typically high-risk groups (23). COVID-19 is
different; it has a low attack rate (29) and severe clinical disease
occurs mainly in the old and those with pre-existing health
conditions (11).
Y. pestis has evolved over centuries to evade and modulate
innate and adaptive immune responses (30). In 1347, naïve
Europeans would have had minimal immunological protection
from the plague. Conversely, pre-existing herd immunity from
years of smallpox circulation spared European colonizers the
widespread mortality observed among naïve populations when
smallpox was introduced to the New Word (9). While Spanish
flu was likely a result of a novel variant, there is evidence of cross-
protection in elderly populations who were exposed to historical
flu outbreaks; this was also observed among survivors of later
flu epidemics (23). It is unknown if exposure to commonly
circulating coronaviruses provides protection against COVID-
19, but reactivity against SARS-CoV-2 has been observed in
T-cells from unexposed people (31).
While much of the modern world would be unrecognizable
to our ancestors, certain dynamics of disease spread remain
the same. Humans and domesticated animals historically lived
at close quarters, and the risk of animal to human disease
transmission was intuitively minimized thousands of years
before a causal relationship was established (32). Communicable
diseases spread more easily where there is poverty and/or high
population density (33, 34), as seen in Marseille where ∼80%
of the population perished in the Black Death (3). In India,
Spanish flu mortality rates among members of the lowest social
class were three times higher than that of other demographic
groups (35). These risk factors remain relevant today: 73% of
emerging infectious diseases in humans originate in animals
(36), including COVID-19 (37). Large cities with international
travel hubs, such as New York and London, were initially hit
hard by COVID-19 and contributed to the unprecedented speed
of global disease spread. Early understanding of the complex,
multi-factorial role of socio-economic deprivation in COVID-
19 spread, indicates that poverty remains a risk factor for poor
outcome from infectious disease (38).
MITIGATION AND ECONOMIC EFFECTS
Science and public health advances have accelerated over the
last 100 years; we should be better equipped to respond to
the current pandemic. The Black Death, New World smallpox
outbreaks, and Spanish flu all occurred before the discovery of
antibiotics and antivirals and the development of centralized
public health surveillance; even the aetiological agent of each
outbreak was unidentified at the time. Early forms of quarantine
and isolation were employed during the Black Death, and
sanitary cordons were enforced by armed guards (17). Outbreak
spread was ultimately unmitigated for both the Black Death and
New World smallpox, and no effective treatment protocols were
available (9, 39). The Native American custom of sleeping in close
proximity to sick individuals would have spread smallpox even
more efficiently (12). Mitigation tactics only slightly improved
for Spanish flu, with sporadic use of non-pharmaceutical
interventions such as track and trace, isolation, and social
distancing (17). Late implementation, poor record-keeping, lack
of a centralized global health body, and wartime priorities
rendered these largely ineffectual. Public gathering spaces and
schools were commonly shut down, but total lockdowns were
not employed. Masks and disinfectants were used liberally,
but ineffectively, and the only treatment was palliative care.
Today, healthcare professionals can deploy antivirals, immune
modulating drugs, antibiotics, oxygen, and ventilators to treat
COVID-19 and related complications. At the time of writing
(December 2020), the first doses of multiple vaccines for COVID-
19 are being administered and surveillance systems have been
established inmany countries. Extensive lockdowns were enacted
in most countries and travel restrictions, social distancing, and
quarantine rules remain in place for the foreseeable future.
Concern that healthcare capacity could be overwhelmed has
stimulated rapid capacity building and shifting existing capacity
away from day-to-day needs to help alleviate COVID-19.
These modern tactics minimized harm from various infectious
diseases but halted critical preventive activities, which may cause
future chronic health burdens and global social and economic
disruption surmounting that of COVID-19 alone (40). Countries
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such as Taiwan, which were able to locally eradicate the virus via
swift but relatively short-lived enactment of nonpharmaceutical
interventions, have suffered the least in terms of health, social
and economic damage from COVID (41). Countries that have
not been as successful in controlling spread of the virus (e.g., the
United States - US) face long term health and economic damage
from poorly coordinated and implemented control plans.
Historically, severity of disease has correlated with severity
of economic outcomes. The Black Death caused a major labor
shortage, providing unprecedented market power to common
people and sparking a European peasant revolt (18). While
trade and industry were temporarily damaged, the socio-
economic structure of society was permanently redressed as
wages increased. Skilled workers were increasingly mobile and
spread innovative technology faster and further than before (18).
Smallpox had less dramatic effects on the evolution of economic
systems, but its unequal impacts on native groups paved the
way for European conquest of the New World, through which
mining of natural resources funded European empire-building
(4). Smallpox often preceded the conquistadors, decimating
populations and leading to starvation among survivors as their
societal structure collapsed (9). Spanish flu closely followed
World War I (WWI); both were particularly deadly for young
to middle-aged men, which led to labor shortages and stalling
of industry (20). These shortages were not as economically
transformative as for the Black Death, perhaps as industry was
less dependent upon mass labor, a smaller proportion of the
overall workforce died, and more women and minors went
into work outside the home (42). There is little evidence that
Spanish flu caused major GDP or consumption declines or stock
market volatility; major fluctuations had already occurred due
to WWI (43, 44). These outbreaks contrast with COVID-19,
which poses minimal physical risk to most of the labor force
but major economic risk from the unprecedented lockdowns and
non-pharmaceutical interventions employed to contain the virus.
Early transient labor shortages were driven by shifts in demand
and movement restrictions (45). Now, mitigation measures drive
record unemployment. COVID-19 related stock market volatility
is unprecedented (43) and national GDPs have plummeted (46).
It remains to be seen what detrimental effects will persist in the
global economy, though experts predict wage contraction and
widespread poverty, with profound effects on emerging markets
and developing economies (21).
COLLECTIVE SOCIAL MEMORY AND
HUMAN BEHAVIOR
The Black Death, smallpox, and Spanish flu no longer pose
an imminent threat to the global population, but they changed
global population structure and economies and prompted
scientific advances in disease eradication, antibiotics, vaccines,
and surveillance systems. It is too early to understand the long-
term effects of SARS-CoV-2 or whether we will eradicate this
pathogen, but we should seek inspiration from the past for how
to move forward in control.
Bubonic plague, smallpox, and Spanish flu have been
controlled by herd immunity and scientific advancements,
though plague and flu still circulate. Localized hotspots of
infection may be our COVID-19 future as this disease
becomes endemic. Over the past 80 years, significant resources
were spent developing surveillance systems, vaccines, and
programs to monitor and manage flu (17). For COVID-
19, it is unlikely we will develop curative treatments, and,
as asymptomatic cases make up an estimated 17.9–30.8%
of infections, disease eradication is unlikely (47). The best
approach may be that birthed from the Spanish flu: develop
vaccines, efficient monitoring systems, and an understanding
the epidemiology of the virus, when endemic. The “end
goal” would be high-level vaccine coverage coupled with
notifiable disease status. This will potentially take a long
time: until this is achieved, how can COVID-19 be managed
with maximal public cooperation coupled with maximizing
economic activity?
Public responses to pandemic disease are largely unchanged
since the Black Death. Disbelief of disease presence,
misinformation, unclear public communication, disregard
for governmental proclamations, and poor personal risk
assessment were and are still common. Despite the rapid onset
of bubonic plague, it often took weeks for plague infection to
be recognized in a population. In 1630s Italy, physicians were
“insulted on the streets” for warning people about the arrival
of the bubonic plague (48). Today, media touting COVID-19
conspiracy theories are amplified by prominent voices (49).
Conflicting information about ongoing disease has long been
spread (purposely or not) by news media, sometimes at the
behest of governmental leadership. In an example of wartime
censorship, the Italian government forced a Milan newspaper to
stop printing daily death tolls during the Spanish flu because it
was too demoralizing (17). In the US, public health officials hid
the extent of disease spread and downplayed the danger it posed
(20). In attempts to keep morale up, leaders inadvertently eroded
trust in public institutions.
Uncertainty and desperation can drive people to use
of dubious modes of protection during disease outbreaks.
Physicians in the 1300s recommended bloodletting and drinking
wine to ward off the plague (15). During the Spanish flu
people wore camphor bags and gargled saltwater, while early
in the COVID-19 pandemic, many sought protection from
zinc lozenges and off-label medications (50). In a parallel to
modern times, official Anti-Mask Leagues were formed in the
US during the Spanish flu, citing insufficient scientific evidence
for mask use and violation of constitutional rights. These
examples demonstrate that public response to pandemics is
driven by personal assessment of risks as shaped by individual
circumstances and belief systems, not necessarily government
mandates. In an attempt to save their economy during
COVID-19, the Swedish government did not impose lockdown.
However, Sweden still experienced economic losses similar to
their neighbors, as people spontaneously reduced mobility and
economic activity (51), being unconvinced by the herd immunity
strategy (52), and presumably having made a decision based their
individual assessment of risk.
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COVID-19 poses a more targeted threat to health than
previous pandemics however we have more understanding of
its etiology and epidemiology than would have been possible
in previous centuries. Why then has our global response been
so profound? Our collective understanding of pandemics, as
shaped by literature and culture, may play some role. The
historical fascination with plagues is evidenced by some of the
earliest surviving English literature and is observed across art
and entertainment. Geoffrey Chaucer’s 1386 “Canterbury Tales”
describes the effects of total social upheaval that arose from the
Black Death and provides insight into a world shaped by the
threat of plague. Albert Camus’s 1947 “The Plague” accurately
captures the now familiar atmosphere of lockdown, obsession
with case counts, and feelings of powerlessness. More recent
movies such as Outbreak and Contagion may be a modern
individual’s reference point for predicting the possibilities of
horrific disease outbreaks (and indeed, sales of these increased
markedly at the pandemic’s outset) (53). All explore the effects
of pandemics on fear as well as fear on pandemics (54). A
specific challenge for the modern era comes via the immediacy
of social media, where genuine and “fake” information are
frequently presented with apparently equal credibility. The
myriad collective experiences and cognitive biases innate to
humanity are further challenges that scientists, policymakers,
figureheads and communicators should be aware of in themselves
and their audiences when formulating and communicating
response plans (55).
CONCLUSION
In the era of COVID-19, scientific and medical advances have
enabled us to identify and treat disease in a way that would
have been unimaginable to previous generations. Therefore, the
biggest danger we face are reactions that are disproportionate
to the nature of risks from COVID-19, leading to challenges
in core social activities of food production, provision of
education, healthcare, and basic health needs. Indeed, one legacy
of COVID-19 may be the corollary deaths that stem from
disease control strategies (40). Major economic downturns are
correlated with chronic disease and mental disorder-associated
mortalities; already in 2020 we have observed short-term excess
deaths not attributed to COVID-19 and reduced healthcare
uptake. To minimize long-term harm to global health targets,
decision-makers must balance the direct health risks from
the virus against those from the socioeconomic effects of
control strategies. The underpinning evidence and reasoning
must be unified across government, medicine, and media, and
presented to a mistrustful public with transparency. As seen
in the past, illogical decision-making and poor leadership have
the potential to multiply harm caused by disease. We must
minimize the impact of this pandemic by accurately assessing and
proportionately responding to the true threats of COVID-19 and
its legacy.
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